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This paper studies the implications of a dynamic general equilibrium 
model with three production sectors, which are agriculture, industry and 
services. Due to the assumption of increasing returns in industry and services, 
our model has multiple equilibria. Two equilibria are stable: one, in which a 
country produces only agricultural goods and converges to a steady state, and 
the other, in which a country operates all three sectors and has positive 
unbalanced long-run growth by contracting agriculture and expanding 
industry and services. These predictions agree well with the real-world 
development experiences of rich and poor countries. In the context of our 
model, we also investigate the evolution of the sectorial composition in the 
transition countries and find that such countries move to the rich rather than to 
the poor world. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper studies the implications of a dynamic general equilibrium model
with three production sectors, which are agriculture, industry and services.
Due to the assumption of increasing returns in industry and services, our
model has multiple equilibria. Two equilibria are stable: one, in which a
country produces only agricultural goods and converges to a steady state,
and the other, in which a country operates all three sectors and has posi-
tive unbalanced long-run growth by contracting agriculture and expanding
industry and services. These predictions agree well with the real-world devel-
opment experiences of rich and poor countries. In the context of our model,
we also investigate the evolution of the sectorial composition in the transition
countries and ﬁnd that such countries move to the rich rather than to the
poor world.
The consumer’s side of our economy is standard: a representative con-
sumer solves an intertemporal utility-maximization problem subject to a
capital-accumulation constraint. Concerning the producer’s side, we assume
that the three sectors produce the same output commodity by using diﬀerent
technologies.1 All three sectors use capital input, and in addition, the agri-
1In this assumption, we follow Hansen and Prescott (2000) who assume that the man-
ufactured and agricultural goods are perfect substitutes.
2cultural sector uses land input. There are positive spillovers across ﬁrms in
the sense of Romer (1986). Speciﬁcally, we assume that having more capital
in industry and services augments productivity of each ﬁrm of these sectors.
If no ﬁrm invests in industry and services, the productivity of these sectors
is zero, so that no individual ﬁrm has incentives to invest there, unless suf-
ﬁc i e n t l ym a n yo t h e rﬁrms do so. This is precisely the feature of the model
that produces multiplicity of equilibrium: countries whose producers manage
to coordinate on opening industry and services become rich, whereas those
whose producers did not succeed in doing so remain poor.
There is a body of literature based on multi-sector models with increas-
ing returns to scale, e.g., Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Kemp and
Schweinberger (1991), Matsuyama (1991, 1992), Rodrik (1996).2 This lit-
erature explains the diﬀerences in patterns of economic development across
countries by multiplicity of equilibrium: rich countries are those that are
situated in high-income equilibria, while poor countries are those that stick
to low-income equilibria.3 Two recent contributions to this literature are
Eswaran and Kotwal (2002) and Graham and Temple (2003). The former
paper extends the standard setup with two sectors, industry and agriculture,
2See also Choi and Yu (2002) for a review of the international-trade literature that
employes the assumption of increasing returns to scale.
3A review of the literature on coordination can be found in Rodrik (2003).
3to include a third sector, services, and studies the role of the service sector
in the process of industrialization. The latter paper calibrates a two-sector
model with economies of scale to the data and establishes whether each con-
sidered country is situated in a low-income or a high-income equilibrium.4
Our paper diﬀers from the above literature in three dimensions. First,
our set of assumptions leads to non-vanishing economic growth in a good
equilibrium, as opposed to a bad equilibrium, in which there is no long-run
growth. In contrast, the assumptions used in previous literature do not admit
long-run growth, so that good and bad equilibria diﬀer only in the steady
state levels. As a result, our model can account for arbitrary large income
diﬀerences between rich and poor countries, whereas a calibrated variant of a
two-steady-state model produces too small income diﬀerences relative to the
data, see Graham and Temple (2003). Secondly, we augment the standard
two-sector model to include the service sector in a dynamic context, which
allows us to focus on time-series patterns of the economic development, while
4Other related literature can be classiﬁed in two groups. One group includes multi-
sector neoclassical growth models, which focus on explaining the time-series behavior of the
sectorial composition of one given country (Hansen and Prescott, 2000, and Kongsamut,
Rebelo and Xie, 1997); in the absence of a permanent cross-country heterogeneity, these
models do not account for the cross-country diﬀerences since the equilibrium in a neoclas-
sical growth model is unique. The other group includes dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models
of comparative advantage, which explain the cross-country diﬀerences by heterogeneity in
preferences and technology (Ventura, 1997), timing of development (Atkeson and Kehoe,
2000), endowment of natural resources (Guilló and Pérez, 2003).
4Eswaran and Kotwal (2002) study the role of the service sector in a static
context. Finally, to test the model’s predictions, we look not only at evidence
from the developed and the developing countries, as the previous literature
does, but also at recent evidence from the transition countries.
The transition economies are currently undertaking a transformation to
market economies, however, it is not clear yet whether they will be trans-
formed to rich or poor market economies. In particular, this is not clear
because the transition process was initially accompanied by a severe eco-
nomic crisis and a dramatic reduction in the living standards. It is therefore
an open question where the transition countries transit. Our model predicts
multiple solutions and thus, it does not allow us to answer this question on
purely theoretical grounds: the transition countries can end up either rich or
poor depending on the equilibrium selected. Nonetheless, our model allows
us to get the answer on empirical grounds, speciﬁcally, we can characterize
the good and bad equilibria in the model and check which of them ﬁts the
development experiences of the transition countries.
In order to establish the equilibrium prevailing in the transition economies,
we trace out the sectorial adjustments taking place in these economies along
the transition process. Initially, the transition countries had large agricul-
tural and industrial sectors, and they had small service sector compared to
5the corresponding sectors in the developed countries. Therefore, if the tran-
sition countries are in the good equilibrium, we should observe an expansion
of the service sector and a contraction of the agricultural and the industrial
sectors. In turn, if they are in the bad equilibrium, we should see agricul-
tural growth at expanse of the other two sectors. We ﬁnd that during the
1990-1999 period, the average output shares of industry and agriculture in
the transition group of countries had reduced from 44.3% to 31.1% and from
20.0% to 17.0%, respectively, and the average output share of services had
increased from 35.7% to 51.9%. We therefore conclude that on average, the
transition economies are in the good equilibrium. The good-equilibrium pat-
tern is particularly pronounced for the most developed transition countries
such as Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Re-
public. For less developed transition countries, the development patterns are
not entirely clear. In particular, such countries as Albania, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had
experienced an increase in the output share of agriculture, which corresponds
to the bad equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model
and deﬁnes the equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the model’s implications.
Section 4 tests the empirical relevance of the model, and ﬁnally, Section 5
6concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section, we develop the model and describe the corresponding equilib-
rium conditions. Time is continuous, and the horizon is inﬁnite, t ∈ [0,∞).
The consumer’s side of the economy consist of a continuum of identical
inﬁnitely-lived agents, and the producer’s side consists of a continuum of
identical production ﬁrms. Both the agents and the ﬁrms have their names
uniformly distributed on a unit interval [0,1], which ensures that variables
of the representative agent and the representative ﬁrm coincides with the
corresponding aggregates.
A representative agent has a period utility function of the Cobb-Douglas


























where K0 > 0 is given. Here, ct is consumption; Kt and rt are the capital
stock and the interest rate, respectively; N and qt are land and its rental
7price, respectively; ρ>0 is the discount rate; γ>0 is the utility function
parameter; δ ∈ (0,1] is the depreciation rate of capital; and ﬁnally, (3) is a
no Ponzi game condition. Land does not depreciate over time. Dot over Kt
represents diﬀerentiation with respect to time.
Ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁrm is composed of three production units, the agricul-
tural, the industrial and the service ones, which we denote by superscripts
”a”, ”i” and ”s”, respectively.5 All three units produce the same output
commodity but use diﬀerent technologies. There are two production inputs
capital, kt, and land, nt. We assume that land is used only by the agricultural
unit, whereas capital is used by all three units. Therefore, the level of output
depends on how the ﬁrm distributes capital across its production units. As
in Romer (1986), we allow for the presence of learning-by-doing spillovers
in the production function. As a result, output of each individual ﬁrm also
depends on how capital is distributed across the agricultural, the industrial
and the service sectors at the aggregate level. Thus, the production function












5The assumption that each ﬁrm can operate in all three sectors is convenient because it
allows us to explicitly separate the intertertemporal decision about the total capital stock
and the intratemporal decisions about the distribution of the total capital stock across
sectors. Equivalently, we could have considered a setup where ﬁrms can operate only in




t ≥ 0 are the capital stocks of the agricultural, the industrial
and the service units, respectively; and Φt is a set of aggregate variables,
which represent spillovers (externalities). For example, Φt can be composed
of the aggregate capital stocks of the three sectors, Ka
t ,Ki
t,Ks




t}. We assume that the production function (4) exhibits constant
returns to scale in private inputs and that it is continuous, diﬀerentiable and
strictly concave.
The ﬁrm maximizes the period-by-period proﬁt taking Φt, rt and qt as
given

































t ≥ 0. (7)
Deﬁnition: An equilibrium in the economy (1) − (7) is deﬁned as a se-
quence for the agent’s allocation {ct,K t+1}
∞
t=0, for prices {rt,q t}
∞
t=0 and for





t=0 such that given the prices:
(i) {ct,K t+1}
∞






t=0 solves the proﬁt-maximization problem (5)−(7);














t,k t = Kt,n t = N;
(iv) all markets clear and the non-negatity constraints are satisﬁed.
It follows from the utility maximization problem (1)−(3) that the agent’s





=[ rt − δ]. (8)
Further, the proﬁt-maximization conditions of the ﬁrm (5) − (7) are de-

















nt =0 ,n t ≥ 0. (10)
In particular, condition (9) implies that if the ﬁrm has no capital in a sector,
this is because such a sector has a rate of return, which is lower than rt.
Also, this condition implies that all sectors, in which the amount of capital
is positive, have the same rate of return, equal to rt.
3 The model’s implications
In this section, we study the implications of the model of Section 2 under par-
ticular assumptions about the production function. We speciﬁcally assume







































This speciﬁcation is based on two simplifying assumptions. First, capital
in both industry and services creates common externalities, and secondly,
those common externalities aﬀect productivity of both industry and services
in the same manner. While these assumptions are very special and should
be treated with caution, they allow us to capture an important feature of
actual economies, namely, that industry uses services much more intensively
than does agriculture, see Eswaran and Kotwal (2002) for a discussion.
Let us characterize the optimal distribution of capital across sectors under
the production function (11).A saﬁrst step, we shall compute the marginal





























































Let us show that in equilibrium, the ﬁrm either invests in both industry and













If the ﬁrm has capital in industry, ki
t > 0,b u tn o ti ns e r v i c e s ,ks






t =0 ; this means that the ﬁrm can increase its proﬁtb yr e i n v e s t i n g
from industry to services, so that we are not in equilibrium. In the same way,
if the ﬁrm has capital in services, ks
t > 0, but not in industry, ki






t = ∞; this means that the ﬁrm can increase its proﬁtb yr e i n v e s t i n g
from services to industry, so that again we are not in equilibrium.
If the ﬁrm invests in both services and industry, then Kuhn-Tucker con-
dition (9) implies that ri
t = rs
t. This fact together with (14) and (15) means












Let us introduce now a new variable kh
t , which is the total amount of capital




12opposed to a low-sophistication sector, agriculture. In terms of this variable,






























Then, the marginal productivity of capital, which is the same for industry














Notice that the assumption of decreasing returns to scale in the agri-
cultural sector ensures that output of this sector is always strictly positive.
In fact, at low levels of development, kt → 0, the marginal productivity of









t =0 , (21)
for all ka
t,k h
t ≥ 0 satisfying ka
t + kh
t = kt. Thus, we have a corner solution
where agriculture attracts all capital, while industry and services are not
developed at all, i.e., ka
t = kt and kh
t =0 . When the aggregate capital stock
becomes large enough, in addition to the corner solution, there is an interior
solution, where the aggregate capital is split between the sectors, so that all















Let us compute a threshold level of the aggregate capital under which the































in which case, according to (23), a half of capital is transferred from agricul-





2k. Under any kt > k, equation
(22) has two diﬀerent solutions, which are given by (23).
Summarizing, the equilibrium dynamics of our economy are described by


















1−β + B (kt − k
a
t)
2−β − δkt − ct, (26)
where ka
t can take three possible values, such as a corner solution kt and
two interior solutions given by (23), provided that kt > k. Assuming that
14the economy sticks to the same solution during all its life, we obtain three
possible equilibria.
Equilibrium I (EI) A l lp r o d u c t i o ni sc o n c e n t r a t e di na g r i c u l t u r e ,a n d
the production of industry and services is zero. The economy converges to a
steady state E∗










I =0 , (27)
where variables with stars and without time subscripts denote steady state
values.
Equilibrium II (EII) All sectors produce non-zero output. The econ-
omy converges to a steady state E∗

















Equilibrium III (EIII) All sectors produce non-zero output, except of
the limiting case t →∞ , when the agricultural sector is closed down. The
economy grows at an increasing growth rate, so that in the limit, we have6
k
a∗
III =0 and k
h∗
III = ∞. (29)
The three equilibria constructed are shown in Figure 1. In fact, Equilib-
rium II is unstable to deviations that aﬀect prices. This can be shown by
6I n s t e a do fa ni n c r e a s i n gg r o w t hr a t e ,w ec a no b t a i na na s y m p t o t i c a l l yc o n s t a n tg r o w t h
rate by assuming a diﬀerent function for externalities, one that satisﬁes lim
kt→∞
ϕ0 (kt)=1 .
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 means of the Marshallian tatonnement argument, which is as follows.7 Sup-
pose that all ﬁrms are situated in Equilibrium II but a coalition of ﬁrms with
a positive measure deviates by investing more capital in agriculture than that
implied by the Equilibrium II strategy. Then, as is seen from Figure 1, the
marginal productivity of capital in agriculture becomes larger than that in
industry and services, ra
t >r h
t ,s ot h a to t h e rﬁrms start shifting capital from
industry and services to agriculture until the economy ends up in Equilib-
rium I. Alternatively, if a group of ﬁrms with a positive measure deviates by
investing more capital in industry and services than that implied by the Equi-
librium II strategy, we have rh
t >r a
t,a n da l lﬁrms re-allocate capital from
agriculture to industry and services until the economy ends up in Equilib-
rium III.8 In contrast, Equilibria I and III are stable to deviations. Consider,
for example, Equilibrium I. If nobody invests in industry and services, the
marginal productivity of these sectors is zero, rh
t =0 .H e n c e ,ra
t >r h
t ,a n d
no ﬁrm has incentives to deviate from the equilibrium strategy, which is to
invest all capital in agriculture. The same type of reasoning can be used to
show the stability of Equilibrium III.
7See Matsuyama (1991) for a discussion.
8One can advocate Equilibrium II by arguing that it is stable under deviations that do
not aﬀect prices, i.e., deviations of one ﬁrm or a group of ﬁrms with a zero measure. It is
also possible to make Equilibrium II stable to the price-aﬀecting deviations by introducing
a d j u s t m e n tc o s t sa si nG r a h a ma n dT e m p l e( 2 0 0 3 ) . I nt h i sp a p e r ,w ed on o tc o n s i d e r
Equilibrium II as it is not relevant for the empirical issues we focus on.
174 Empirical evidence
In this section, we discuss the empirical relevance of the model. As a ﬁrst step,
we shall summarize the model’s testable implications. As we have shown in
Section 3, in the presence of spillovers, we have two stable equilibria, and the
model itself does not provide a way to discriminate between them. Which of
the two equilibria prevails will depend on coordination of economic agents.
According to our model, poor and slow-growing countries are those that
are situated in Equilibrium I; such countries produce exclusively agricultural
products. In turn, rich and fast-growing countries are those that are situated
in Equilibrium III; such countries have a low (decreasing with time) share of
agriculture and a high (increasing with time) share of industry and services.
To test the validity of these model’s implications, we investigate the em-
pirical relationship between the countries’ sectorial composition and their
economic performance. Our data come from the World Development Indica-
tors CD-ROM (2000) data set. We distinguish the groups of 10 richest and
10 poorest countries in the sample by the level of GDP in 1999 and the group
of 26 transition countries. (The countries entering each group are listed in
the note b of Table 1). In Figure 2, we plot the evolution of the GDP level,
and the GDP and labor shares of agriculture, industry and services over the
18Table 1. The GDP level, and the GDP and labor shares of industry, agriculture and services: their evolution in the 
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Notes: 
a Source: World Development Indicators CD ROM (2000).  
b The 10 richest countries are Switzerland, Denmark, Japan, Luxemburg, U.S., Netherlands, Norway, Iceland, 
Belgium and Austria (in descending order).  
The 10 poorest countries are Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Rwanda, Chad, Nepal, Niger, Sierra Leona, Malawi, 
Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo (in descending order).  
The 26 transition countries are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (in alphabetic order).  
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Figure 2. The GDP level, and the GDP and the labor shares of industry, agriculture and services:
their evolution in 26 transition, 10 richest and 10 poorest countries over 1990-1999. 
Note: For the 10 poorest countries, the labor shares are the averages of the corresponding variables 
over 1990-1999. 1990-1999 period for the three groups distinguished, and in Figures 3, 4 and
5, we plot the same time series for each of the transition countries consid-
ered. In Table 1, we provide the corresponding groups’ statistics. To check
the robustness of tendencies observed, in Table 1, we also report statistics
for the groups of 20 richest and 20 poorest countries in the sample.
First of all, we see from Table 1 that there is an enormous diﬀerence in
the level of economic development between our groups of 10 richest and 10
poorest countries, whose per-capita GDPs diﬀer by a factor of more than 150.
Further, we observe a striking diﬀerence in the sectorial compositions between
rich and poor economies. For example, for the 10 richest countries, the output
(labor) share of agriculture is 3.6% (5.1%), the output share of industry
is 27.9% (28.3%) and the output share of services is 68.5% (66.7%). In
contrast, for the 10 poorest countries, the output (labor) share of agriculture
is 41.1% (69.2%), the output share of industry is 19.7% (12.2%) and the
output share of services is 39.2% (18.6%). That is, rich countries have a
small agricultural sector and large industrial and service sectors, while poor
countries have a large agricultural sector and small industrial and service
sectors. According to our model, rich and poor countries are those that are
situated in Equilibrium III and Equilibrium I, respectively, and we therefore
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Figure 4. The evolution of the GDP shares of industry, agriculture and services in the transition 
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Figure 5. The evolution of the labor shares of industry, agriculture and services in the transition 
countries over 1990-1999.                                                                   As far as the evolution of the sectorial composition is concerned, it is
well-known that the currently rich countries have experienced a dramatic
decline in the output share of agriculture and an increase in the output
shares of industry and services over the process of economic development.
In contrast, the sectorial composition of the currently poor countries have
been stable during a relatively long period. For the corresponding evidence,
see, e.g., Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (1997), Hansen and Prescott (2000).
Thus, our model can successfully account not only for the diﬀerences in the
development patterns observed across rich and poor countries but also for
time-series patterns of economic development of rich and poor countries.
We shall now turn to transition countries, which are the main subject of
our investigation. When the Soviet system was broken down and transition
to market economy began, the former Soviet countries were roughly in the
middle between rich and poor countries. In 1990, the average transition
country had per-capita GDP, which was about 10 times smaller than that
of 10 richest countries but which was about 10 times larger than that of 10
poorest countries. As far as the sectorial composition of transition economies
is concerned, it was artiﬁcially created under the Soviet central-planning
system, and it was not typical for either rich or poor market economies. In
1990, the average transition country had a very large industrial sector with
25the output (labor) share of 44.3% (34.8%), a relatively small service sector
with the output (labor) share of 35.7% (42.0%) and a medium agricultural
sector with the output (labor) share of 20.0% (25.7%).
There is one question concerning the transition countries, which is of
much interest to address in the context of our model, namely: "Where do the
transition countries transit now, to rich or poor countries?" Indeed, according
to our model, each country can become either rich or poor depending on
which equilibrium it coordinates on. Therefore, our next step will be to
use the available empirical evidence in order to establish which of the two
equilibria the transition countries have selected.
The tendencies in Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3 about the output dynamics
in the transition countries are not entirely conclusive in this respect. Most of
the transition countries experienced a J-curve output pattern over the 1990-
1999 period: in 1990, the average per-capita GDP of the transition countries
expressed in constant 1995 $US was 2932.7; in 1995, it reached a minimum
of 2015.5; and in 1999, it rose to 2313.9. Although during the last years, the
transition countries exhibit an upward trend in the per-capita GDP, it is not
yet clear whether such a trend is a result of a recovery after the crisis or it is
an indication of having jumped to a stable growth path. In fact, most of the
transition countries still have not reached the output level which they had at
26the beginning of transition.
We now focus on the evolution of the sectorial composition of the transi-
tion countries. Recall that according to our model, an economy situated in
the good equilibrium (Equilibrium III) has the agricultural sector decreas-
ing over time, and it has the industrial and service sectors increasing over
time, with the latter two sectors being in a ﬁxed proportion given by (18).
Since the former Soviet countries had excessively large industrial sectors and
excessively small service sectors relative to the corresponding sectors in rich
countries, in the good equilibrium, the transition countries should decrease
both the industrial and agricultural sectors and they should increase the ser-
vice sector. On opposite, in a bad equilibrium (Equilibrium I), the transition
countries should increase the agricultural sector and decrease both the in-
dustrial and service sectors. In our simple setup, a reallocation of capital
from one sector to another is costless, and thus, all changes in the sectorial
composition can take place instantaneously. In a more realistic model with
adjustment costs, the changes in the sectorial composition will be subject
to some inertia. Thus, we should not take the model’s prediction about the
instantaneous adjustment literally but rather try to see whether the evolu-
tion of the sectorial composition in the transition countries is consistent with
Equilibrium I or Equilibrium III.
27As is seen from Table 1, during the 1990-1999 period, the output shares of
the industrial and the agricultural sectors in the transition countries reduced
from 44.3% to 31.1% and from 20.0% to 17.0%, respectively, and the output
share of the service sector increased from 35.7% to 51.9%. Similar regularities
hold for the changes in the distribution of the labor force across sectors: the
labor shares of the industrial and the agricultural sectors reduced from 34.8%
to 27.8% and from 25.7% to 23.2%, respectively, while the labor share of the
service sector increased from 42.0% to 49.0%. Thus, there is strong evidence
that the sectorial composition of the transition countries as a group converges
to that of rich rather than poor countries.
We ﬁnally look at the evolution of the sectorial composition for each
individual country in the transition group. Notice that the sectorial out-
put shares in Figure 4 do not always expose the same tendencies as do the
sectorial labor shares in Figure 5, which is because the former shares are
inﬂuenced by changes in the relative productivity of sectors. Nonetheless,
for such countries as Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland
and Slovak Republic, the pattern implied by Equilibrium III is well seen for
both the output and the labor shares, and their sectorial composition cur-
rently approaches the one of the 10 richest countries. In fact, these transition
countries are ones that do best in economic terms. On the contrary, the tran-
28sition countries doing poorly have experienced the changes in their sectorial
composition that put them closer to poor than to rich countries. According
to the output-shares ﬁgure, Albania signiﬁcantly increased the agricultural
sector; Turkmenistan both increased the industrial sector and decreased the
service sector; and such countries as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic
and Uzbekistan exhibited changes in their sectorial composition that lack
ad e ﬁnite pattern. In turn, as follows from the labor-shares ﬁgure, such
countries as Bulgaria, Croatia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania and
Tajikistan expanded their agricultural sector. In the case of Bulgaria and
Croatia, we also observe an expansion of the service sector but such an ex-
pansion is not suﬃcient to absorb all labor exiting the industrial sector. The
agricultural growth in Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania and Tajikistan
is more worrying in a sense that it was not accompanied by visible growth
of the service sector and hence, it may indicate that those countries move to
the bad equilibrium.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a general equilibrium three-sector growth model, in
which the agricultural sector has constant returns to scale, while the indus-
trial and the service sectors have increasing returns to scale. The presence
29of economies of scale in our model leads to multiplicity of equilibrium. Our
model predicts that rich and fast-growing countries are ones that are situated
in the good equilibrium: such countries experience non-vanishing growth,
they reduce agriculture, and increase industry and services over time. In
turn, poor and stagnating countries are ones that are situated in the bad
equilibrium: they have no long-run growth and specialize in the natural-
resource-based agriculture. In our setup, each country can become rich and
fast-growing if economic agents manage to coordinate on the good equilib-
rium.
Our model provides a framework for analyzing the development experi-
ence of the transition countries. It predicts that if the transition countries
move to the rich world, we should see a reallocation of resources from indus-
try and agriculture to services, whereas, if they move to the poor world, we
must observe an expansion of agriculture. Our empirical analysis suggests
that overall, the transition countries move to the good equilibrium. This is
undoubtfully true for the most developed countries in the transition sample
such as Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovak
Republic, whose sectorial composition is now close to that of the world rich-
est countries. However, for less developed transition countries, the develop-
ment pattern is not entirely clear. In particular, such countries as Albania,
30Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan have experienced growth of the agricultural sector, which can be
viewed as an indication of being in the bad equilibrium.
References
[1] Atkeson, A. and P. Kehoe, 2000, Paths of development for early- and
late-bloomers in a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model, Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department Staﬀ Report 256.
[2] Choi, J. and E. Yu, 2002, External economies in the international trade
theory: a survey, Review of International Economics 10, 708-728.
[3] Eswaran, M. and A. Kotwal, 2002, The role of the service sector in
the process of industrialization, Journal of Development Economics 68,
401-420.
[4] Guilló, M. and F. Pérez, 2003, The curse and blessing of ﬁxed speciﬁc
factors in small open economies, IVIE WP-AD 2003-36.
[5] Graham, B. and J. Temple, 2003, Rich nations, poor nations: How much
can multiple equilibria explain? manuscript.
[6] Hansen, G. and E. Prescott, 2002, Malthus to Solow, American Eco-
nomic Review 60, 895-911.
[7] Kemp, M. and A. Schweinberger, 1991, Variable returns to scale, non-
uniqueness of equilibrium and the gains from international trade, Review
of Economic Studies 58, 807-816.
[8] Kongsamut, P., S. Rebelo and D. Xie, 1997, Beyond balanced growth,
NBER Working Paper 6159.
[9] Matsuyama, K., 1991, Increasing returns, industrialization and indeter-
minacy of equilibrium, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 617-650.
[10] Matsuyama, K., 1992, Agricultural productivity, comparative advan-
tage, and economic growth, Journal of Economic Theory 58, 317-334.
[11] Murphy, K., A. Schleifer and R. Vishny, 1989, Industrialization and the
big push, Journal of Political Economy 97, 1003-1026.
31[12] Rodrik, D., 1996, Coordination failures and government policy: a model
with application to East Asia and Eastern Europe, Journal of Interna-
tional Economics 40, 1-22.
[13] Rodrik, D., 2003, Growth strategies, In: P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, Eds.,
Handbook of Economic Growth, Ch. 5.
[14] Romer, P., 1986, Increasing returns and long-run growth, Journal of
Political Economy 94, 1002-1037.
[15] Ventura, J., 1997, Growth and interdependence, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 112, 57-84.
32